The Arab-Israeli Conflict with Professor Krause
Abstract: This paper will seek to better understand which conditions are best suited for promoting the end of ethnic conflict. Specifically, this paper will address the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict and consider why there is still yet to be an end to the dispute, despite numerous proposed peace plans. The cases that will be cross-examined are the cases of the Rwandan Genocide in 1994 and the Yugoslav Wars from 1991 to 2001 as examples of resolved conflicts. First, this paper will analyze the differing theories of Partitionists and Dynamists who present different conditions that allow for the greatest chances of peace. Then, this paper will use the best available theory to consider what actions should be taken in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza in order to hopefully finally create a lasting peace agreement between the two groups.
Ethnic conflicts have been an increasingly common modern phenomena in the 20th and 21st centuries. These conflicts have arisen in the Balkans, the Middle East, Northern Ireland, China, Rwanda and Myanmar all in the span of a few generations. According to political scientist Ted Gurr, “about three-quarters of the world’s refugees, estimated at nearly 27 million people, are in flight from or have been displaced by … ethnic conflicts”. Some theories suggest this is a result of the transition of monarchial states to democratic ones. Which also reflects a transition from class divisions to ethnic ones. Other theories push the idea that rises in nationalism and national movements are a natural response to the ongoing trend of globalization. Many smaller cultural, ethnic, and religious minorities feel threatened by the Western influence of globalization. The effects of the rise in ethnic violence have devastated communities like Jews, Poles, Uighurs, Tutsis, and many others. No matter the reason, it is true that there were more ethnic conflicts in the 20th century than any other period before.
This proposal will explore the question, “Under what conditions are ethnic conflicts more likely to end?” The conclusion I have made is that in order for conflicts to be best suited for a resolution, the two groups must be socially and systemically connected to each other, rather than segregated. Specifically, this paper will address the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict and consider why there is still yet to be an end to the dispute, despite numerous proposed peace plans. Juxtaposing this, this paper will cross examine the Rwandan Genocide and the Yugoslav Wars as examples of a resolved and a once unresolved conflict. Some of the possible factors that could have an effect on the success of the movements could be foreign intervention or lack thereof, colonialist legacies, historical or religious claims to territory, and unequal power dynamics. However, on top of these factors, ultimately this paper will assess the conditions of suppression of minority groups, reconstruction of ethnic identities, power-sharing, and segregation of groups as possible solutions. Doing so will offer a better understanding of how the Arab-Israeli conflict has failed to accomplish the same resolutions.
The shift from class to ethnic conflicts in the early 20th century has been studied by a number of scholars, sociologists, and political scientists. There are a number of theories that attempt to explain this modern phenomenon. The ones that we will explore are those of the modernist and primordialist view. Establishing a lens to examine this research question will better explain the paper’s perspective and remedy any confusion on the origins of the case conflicts.
It is important to first define the terms of modernity, modernist, and primordialist. Fred Riggs defines modernity as, “to refer to the structural changes that link a modern state with industrialization, democratization, and national identity”. The modernist perspective uses this definition to claim that as states modernize, they centralize and create shared customs and education which inevitably creates states. They define states on their ability to modernize and define themselves on their terms. On the other side is the primordialist viewpoint which believes that some cultures have characteristics that lead them to develop into nations, which later evolve into nation-states. This suggests that certain ethnic groups are more predisposed to becoming nation-states than others. The social-constructivists remedy the two and suggest that both industrialization and ethnies lead to the development of states. For the purposes of this paper, I will be using the modernist perspective, which assumes that stateless nations are not inherently unable to acquire statehood. But, rather have yet to access the necessary capital (money, territory, etc.) to do so. This will be especially relevant when this paper will examine the privileges citizens of countries have that stateless peoples lack.
This paper will first examine two main conflicting theories known as the Dynamist and Partitionist approaches. Both theories have substantial evidence to suggest their success in certain conflicts. First I will examine other, less supported conditions such as suppression of minority groups, reconstruction of ethnic identities and power-sharing. I will examine how these theories are either unrealistic to implement or too temporary in nature to prevent continued conflict. Next, I will examine possible impeding factors that prevent conditions to foster peace which as stated before are foreign intervention or lack thereof, colonialist legacies, historical or religious claims to territory, and unequal power dynamics. Next, I will analyze how failed states that have suffered deep ethnic violence have risen above and alleviated residual ethnic tension. Then, I will analyze how territorial disputes can lay waste to disenfranchised ethnic minorities. Lastly, I will consider how you can measure the different levels of success in a so-called ‘resolved’ conflict. Finally, I will conclude with how these findings can offer a more nuanced approach to resolving ethnic conflict through diplomacy and policy.
Ending Ethnic Conflicts: Separate or Integrate?
Based on the research conducted for this paper, it is compelling to assert that the best conditions for ending protracted ethnic conflicts is not the separation of ethnic groups but rather the deliberate integration of groups into more heterogeneous societies. Obviously, the implications of this tactic are significant because if groups are already experiencing violence, they are less likely to work together. But according to many scholars, specifically the work of Sherril Stroschein, this condition is what has generated the best examples of long term resolutions. This theory emphasizes the importance of fluid, flexible, and dynamic policy that can allow groups to foster better relations on their own terms; rather than static segregation. For the purposes of this paper I will refer to this viewpoint as the ‘dynamism’ viewpoint.
Before delving into differing factors and theories on how these conflicts might end, first it must be understood how and why ethnic conflicts last. This circumstance is known as Barry Posen’s conception of the security dilemma which he explains as, “a situation in which actions taken by a state to increase its own security cause reactions from other states, which in turn lead to a decrease rather than an increase in the original state’s security”. This theory posits that territorial disputes or technological advances of certain countries can be viewed as existential threats to another country. Now, this does not specifically pertain to ethnic groups, but according to sociologist Micheal Mann, “ethnic hostility rises where ethnicity trumps class as the main form of social stratification, in the process capturing and channeling classlike sentiments toward ethnonationalism”.
Dynamism is the theory that rejects segregation as a viable vehicle for ethnic tension resolution and instead posits the benefits of the integration of different ethnic groups into shared civil societies. The theory does not only demand ethnic mixing and reducing homogenous societies but it also demands groups interact often enough that facilitates communication between groups. This theory, as presented by Stroschein, rejects the notion of ethnicity as static in nature and instead says that ethnicity is a by-product of its environment. Ethnic groups can be reinforced by violence but they also can be broken down. Stroschein emphasizes, “the potential benefits of ethnic mixing do not appear automatically; instead, they emerge from dynamic conditions, such as the presence of an active (and interactive) civil society that facilitates actual communication”. She uses the example of certain Indian cities that have similar demographics but have drastically different levels of unrest. She states, “Indian cities with high levels of civil society and regular inter-ethnic commercial exchanges are less likely to experience violence than are cities with low levels of exchange, regardless of their demographic structure”. Rates of violence and levels of civil society should be the operational variables when studying these cases. Only assessing harsh examples of ethnic tensions without positioning these examples against other societies and or cities with similar demographics fails in their attempts at deriving causality. Another necessary component to this theory is the need for internal controls on ethnic violence. Nationalist attitudes and animosity towards adversaries can only be effectively terminated within these groups. Stroschien presents, “that conflict between groups is prevented not through a cross-group mechanism, but instead through ‘in-group policing’, in which groups enact sanctions against their own members for engaging in acts against ethnic others”. The efforts necessary for the resolution to ethnic tensions cannot be underestimated. Every case is entirely unique to their location, relationships, and power-dynamics.
The most conflicting theory to dynamism is formally known as the ‘Partitionist’ theory by many scholars. This is the theory that places separation of ethnic groups as the only viable means of resolution once violence has occurred. Scholars like Chaim Kauffman theorize that, “once groups have experienced an ‘ethnic’ war, ethnic identities will ‘harden’ such that groups will be rendered unable to cohabit territory without renewed violence—nor will they be able to cooperate in jointly governing a state”. This ‘hardening’ of ethnic groups suggests that ethnic violence between groups condemns them irreparable. Kauffman rests this theory based on the conception that, “hypernationalist mobilization rhetoric and real atrocities harden ethnic identities to the point that cross-ethnic political appeals are unlikely to be made and even less likely to be heard”. The logic of the partitionist viewpoint is centralized around the finality of ethnic tension and ethnic segregation. Therefore, within this perspective, the only possible solution to ending protracted violence is to segregate the groups geographically, socially, and structurally. Stroschein analyzes, “simply drawing a partition line is not enough—the policy will only be successful in conjunction with the transfer of peoples from areas in which they might be minorities to territories with a majority of their co-ethnics”. Partitionists essentially restrict any possible solutions to a very specific type of conflict: one that can offer all groups territory and the means of population transfer.
It is apparent that this outlook is very limited in scope and denies the harsh reality of population transfers and difficulty in resolving territorial disputes. It fails to consider the complexity of ethnicity within families, communities, and cultures. Not every ethnic conflict will be binary in nature. Not every family is homogenous. Population exchanges have also demonstrated a major propensity for being used as tools for ethnic cleansing. Moreover, the legality of forced military deportation of groups have been discounted by Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. An example of population transfer that killed thousands was the Greek-Turkish exchange of 1.5 million people in 1923 that resulted in the deaths of roughly 800,000 people. This is not a viable solution to the ongoing rise in ethnic conflicts and fails to consider the lack of available territory that is left in our increasingly centralizing and modernizing world. It also assumes the consent of the people involved which in almost all past examples is not apparent. The forced expulsion of groups will only further isolate, harm, and traumatize these already vulnerable populations.
Another fault in this position is that it disregards the success of numerous heterogeneous societies that flourish with diverse populations, cultures, and languages. These examples far outweigh the number of deep ethnic conflicts that are seen today; which suggests that the problem is not diversity of population. Stroschein explains, “one reason that we do not see perpetual conflict throughout the globe is that identities do not simply automatically ‘harden’ and remain persistent—the boundary may also deactivate, or may even change over time”. It seems as well that partitionists assume the oversight of international actors that will regulate and enforce these grand plans. Manipulating demographics is not the one step solution to these problems and fails to address the real complexities of ethnic tensions. Stroschein criticizes the theory’s myopic nature, “those ‘left behind’ or watching from neighbouring states may perceive that in a world of partition policies, violence may be a viable strategy to elicit territorial rewards from the international community”. Making this assumption that any territorial dispute can be solved by the swift action of expelling people could motivate political entrepreneurs even more to rile up ethnic animosity and violence in the hopes of being handed autonomy over territory.
Other examples of possible conditions that are less supported offer a window into the reality of what life is like for many minority groups vying for autonomy. One of these examples is known as the suppression of minorities, which Kauffman defines as, “many ethnic civil wars lead to the complete victory of one side and the forcible suppression of the other”. One could argue that this is the sad reality for the Uighurs in China, the Ibo in Nigeria, Tibetans in China, the Kurds in Syria and Turkey, and the Native peoples in the Americas. All too often, minority groups are subjugated to the will of their oppressor with no say in their rights, no representation, and often violent suppression of resistance. Suppression is not a solution to ethnic violence but rather a troubling reality for many groups. It increases negative ethnic relations, incentivizing violent rebellion and upheaval of the state.
Another possible example of resolution is the reconstruction of ethnic identities. This is similar in nature to the goals of Dynamism and is often used by social-constructivists. However nice this solution would be, it overestimates the fluidity of ethnicity. Ethnic identities cannot be reimagined in a generation; rendering any tensions futile. They can evolve over time, but the goal should be to reimagine relations between adversarial groups. The paritionists are right when they emphasize the enduring persistence of ethnic groups. This theory is simply too idealistic for the all too real tensions that are felt like in for example the Kashmir region between Pakistan and India. Generational trauma is real and they do perpetuate these conflicts. Reimagining ethnicity may become easily done some day. But for now focus should be on the relations between said groups, not their identities.
Power-sharing is another ideal but improbable solution to these kinds of disputes. This idea suggests the collaboration of groups would foster shared governance over a disputed territory. This would require the consent of the groups to share the territory and rule together in democratic functions of government. Kauffman suggests, “even if political mobilization is organized on ethnic lines, civil politics can be maintained if ethnic elites adhere to a power-sharing bargain that equitably protects all groups”. If political elites could come together and form a coalition, the chances of inspiring the populations is possible. However, this according to Kauffman would require, “1) joint exercise of governmental power; 2) proportional distribution of government funds and jobs; 3) autonomy on ethnic issues (which, if groups are concentrated territorially, may be achieved by regional federation); and 4) a minority veto on issues of vital importance to each group”. For anyone who has studied territorial or ethnic disputes of the past, the likelihood of this positive cooperation is slim due to: two level games. Two-level game theory is a model used for when elites negotiate with international actors, but are also constrained by the desires of their domestic policies and own populations. Leaders will not undermine the goals of their populations, whether that be goals for autonomy, territorial claims, or religious convictions. Failure to do so can undermine their approval as a political leader or their safety if they are threatened by more radical factions of their own ethnic group. Leaders often fall to the will of radicals that influence the opinions within their group. Obviously, the idea of two adversaries coming together to form a coalition government is the best case scenario in these situations. But, that is often unrealistic due to the different demands groups have established and differing narratives on the history of said conflicts.
The last possible solution is state-building, which is only applicable in the example of failed states. Kauffman explains this as, “states in which government breakdown, economic failure, and internal violence imperil their own citizens and threaten neighboring states can be rescued by international “conservatorship” to administer critical government functions until the country can govern itself following a free and fair election”. Kauffman, who is a Paritionist, highlights the benevolent assistance international actors can offer for disputes that have resulted in the disintegration of sovereign governance and rule of law. This solution is complex because it’s success is wholly dependent on the collaboration of the groups. He continues, “even if conservatorship could rapidly, effectively, and cheaply stop an ethnic civil war, rebuild institutions, and ensure free elections, nothing would be gained unless the electoral outcome protected all parties’ interests and safety; that is, power-sharing would still be necessary”. Again, these solutions do not hold the same weight as Dynamists and Partitionists because they underestimate the harsh relations, demands, and histories groups have that discourage collaboration between them.
The Rwandan Genocide
Ethnic groups in Rwanda have a unique origin unlike most ethnic conflicts. Rwanda became independent in 1962 from Belgium. However, the effects the German and Belgian colonists left on Rwandans culturally and socially are still felt today. This is because Hutus and Tutsis were artificial ethnic and class placements placed on Rwandans in order to create a loyal elite that would rule the country for the Europeans. Tutsis were viewed as racially superior and therefore were given many privileges of the Hutu majority. Gellner says, “It thrived on visible differences. If the rulers were different from the ruled, well that helped identification and habituation, and all was well. If these differences ran out, they could be invented”. After the country’s independence, ethnic tensions remained and grievances over Tutsis relationship with colonists created a lot of animosity toward the minority group. Over time class differences between the two groups appeared to blend together throughout the 80s and 90s. But, examples of mass Tutsi executions in the neighboring country of Burundi suggest that international concerns for Rwanda were naive in nature. Scheffer writes, “The international community’s collective detachment from the reality unfolding in Burundi sent a strong signal to extremist Hutus in Rwanda that the shooting gallery was open, free of charge”. The US’s failure to intervene once the violence erupted is another example of why international actors cannot be relied on to stop ethnic violence from happening.
The Rwandan Genocide was the ethnic cleansing of an estimate 800,000 to 1 million Tutsi and moderate Hutus from April to June 1994. Roughly 77% of Rwandan Tutsis and 20% of the general population were killed. Over 250,000 women were raped; many by HIV positive militiamen in the aim of further harming and destroying the Tutsi identity. This led to The United Nations Human Rights Commission establishing and passing a resolution identifying rape as a war crime in 1993. It resulted in a refugee crisis that forced 2 million Hutus to flee. The violence erupted when President Juvénal Habyarimana, a Hutu, was assassinated when his plane was shot down on April 6, 1994. Political entrepreneurs and radical Hutus called for the cleansing of Tutsis from the world through national radio broadcasts. Poor historical relations motivated the masses and quickly neighbors were turned on each other, inter-ethnic families were slaughtered for having Tutsi relatives, and moderate Hutus who refused to participate were executed as well. The Rwandan example is one of the most disturbing examples of volatile ethnic violence. Barry Posen wrote, “ongoing back and forth of drastic power and social privileges between the two groups over the country’s history led to feelings of revenge, conservation of power”. Radicals co-opted these tensions and declared that Tutsis and Hutus were unable to live together harmoniously.
The purpose of analyzing this conflict is that Rwanda today has seemingly resolved their ethnic tensions, despite experiencing one of the worst ethnic cleansing in modern history. This is largely due to the campaign of ‘reconciliation villages.’ According to The New Humanitarian, villages with, “hundreds of Hutu and Tutsi families now live side by side in “reconciliation villages” which they have built together and work together to maintain”. These villages are populated by both victims and perpetrators of the conflict, who live in peace today. Many are neighbors with people who killed their own families. Remarkably, Rwanda has demonstrated an earnest and wildly successful campaign to prevent the ethnic cleansing from ever happening again. In schools, children are taught that they are ‘Rwandan’ instead of members in former ethnic groups. There are still some social taboos that have resonated, for example it is still uncommon for Tutsis and Hutus to date socially. However, if one would measure the success of resolution of ethnic conflicts in terms of the end of violence, Rwanda is an exceptional example of the steps countries can make in order to eliminate negative ethnic tensions; even after they have experienced harsh violence. This is a perfect example to rebuttal the Partionists notion that once ethnic violence has occurred, there is no possibility for reconciliation. Reconciliation villages are exactly the type of facilitated, collaborative, civil societies in which communication is encouraged amongst groups that Stroschein is calling for. For the Rwandan example, segregation was clearly not the solution, and all Rwandans are living in safer conditions because of it.
The Yugoslav Wars:
The next case that will be selected is the Yugoslav Wars, specifically the civil war that erupted in 1991 and continued until 2001 in the former country of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. For the purposes of this paper, I will analyze the Yugoslav Wars as if they are ongoing, in order to compare where the Arab-Israeli Conflict is on the road to peace. This country was a relic of WWII when it was under the occupation rule of the Axis Powers of Nazi Germany and fascist Italy. After the war, Yugoslavia was reestablished as a country with six different independent republics: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia. Ethnic tensions were always a problem in the country due to its various number of different ethnic groups. Before the wars, “They found that while local opc´ine (municipalities) with dispersed, heterogeneous populations exhibited high levels of tolerance, tolerance was generally lower in more homogeneous enclave areas—where state-wide minorities form a local majority”. This information is evidence to support her assertion that desegregated societies foster more tolerance amongst different groups of people.
The conflict arose however, when Serbia absorbed its independent region of Kosovo by force in the aim of creating a more unified Yugoslavia. Following the resulting dissolution of the League of Communists, the six republics instated their own political ruling parties and declared independence. Barry Posen explains the tensions around this, “the parties identified the re-emerging identities of the others as offensive threats. The last time these groups were free of constraint, during World War II, they slaughtered one another with abandon”. Bosnian Muslims (also known as Bosniaks) had all the justification to fear what crimes an independent Croatia or Serbia might commit in order to attain desired demographics or territory. Serbian forces used their large military capabilities to threaten and intimidate the other republics that had large populations of Serbs to reconsider their newly claimed independence.
Nevertheless, Yugoslavia is a different example of ethnic conflict, in that ethnic cleansing was not the goal, but a byproduct of military territorial claims. Stroschein highlights, “The examples presented here illustrate how ethnicity alone was not a driver of conflict; rather, it operated in conjunction with strategic drives for territory or material goals”. This is demonstrated by the subsequent slaughter of Bosnian Muslims but the apparent sparing of Sandak Muslims. She explains, “Ironically, it was the Sandak Muslims, living within the territory of Serbia/Yugoslavia, who were safer from Serb violence than those living on Bosnian territory…Because Sandak already fell within Serbian boundaries, the tactic of killing Muslims there was therefore deemed unnecessary”. This conception of ethnic cleansing as a ‘sometimes necessary’ means of territory acquisition in war can illuminate the ways that ethnic tension might continue or end once violence has ended.
Sherill Stroschein uses the Dayton Agreement or Dayton Accords As an example for dynamic and flexible public policy that can result in inclusive resolution to once dire ethnic violence. According to Encyclopedia Britannica, “[the Dayton Accords] preserved Bosnia as a single state made up of two parts, the Bosniak-Croat federation and the Bosnian Serb Republic, with Sarajevo remaining as the undivided capital city”. The Agreement was praised for resolving the concerns of partition between the six newly independent countries. Slowly, the agreement has evolved to better accommodate changing demographics and allow for more ethnic mixing. Stroschien outlines, “ Given the particular tension regarding state centralization, Dayton’s institutional ambiguity on this issue has allowed each group to view Dayton as it wishes”. When Bosniaks prefer a centralized government and Serbs and Croats prefer localized powers, the agreement allows for both to interpret and implement policy through how they see fit. Perhaps, the Dayton Agreement can serve as a model for policy that must accommodate for a number of differing groups and interests, while still upholding the necessary functions of government and rule of law.
Arab-Israeli Conflict: The Problem of Religion
According to Daniel Tel-Bar the Arab-Israeli conflict, “was protracted, violent, total, central, with much investment in its continuation; it was perceived as irreconcilable and zero-sum”. The Arab-Israeli conflict shares numerous similarities with the Rwandan Genocide and the Yugoslav Wars. For Rwanda, both conflicts were very similar in power dynamics. The privileges and power awarded to the ruling minority, the Hutus, over the Tutsis can be compared to the power Israel wields over Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. As for Yugoslavia, both cases have examples of major diasporic financial support for ethnic groups, historical and religious claims to land, unapologetic national movements, generational trauma and fear of future oppression, and ruling powers subjugating ethnic groups to their will without political representation.
Palestinians suffer deeply from being stateless. As mentioned before, Palestinians are suppressed by Israelis totally. But, suppression as expressed by Stroschien, is not a solution to conflict and instead escalates violence and incentivizes rebellion by the minority. Although, Palestinians do not have the military capability to counteract Israeli’s, they do exist within a security dilemma because of the Zionist goals for a Jewish state. The Palestinians existence is a direct threat to the goals of the Jewish state, which includes the need for a Jewish majority. If Palestinians were repatriated as Israelis and allowed the privileges of citizenship, they would become the ethnic majority, destroying the Jewish state. Therefore, the problem that is holding the Arab-Israeli conflict back from creating a substantial Peace Agreement is the religious narrative.
Obviously, it would be naive to underestimate the value Zionism and the Jewish state holds for millions of Israelis, the international Jewish diaspora, and Israeli’s powerful allies like the United States. But, in order to consider a more positive alternative for the Palestinians, we must consider the options for a more civil and integrated society between Palestinians and Israelis. This may sound bold to some who will reference the decades of violence that both sides have subjugated each other too. However, as seen by Rwanda and Yugoslavia, there are positive options for cohabitation or at the very least autonomous grants to groups that can foster a more peaceful future. It is clear that the rise in Jewish settlements is a concern for Palestinians, who already suffer greatly in the West Bank and Gaza. Perhaps, the antagonization of Palestinians through high rates of police brutality by Israel Defense Forces (IDF), checkpoints that limit freedom of movement, and increased acquisition of Palestinian lands have prevented the possibility for peace more than citizen ethnic violence.
Conclusion
The conditions of which ethnic conflict can participate are diverse and are found in numerous numbers around the world. Our increasingly globalizing and modernizing world presents a lot of unknowns for smaller ethnic and cultural communities who are under threat of being left behind in the wave of Westernization. According to Catarine Kinnvall, “it is a world where many people feel intensified levels of insecurity as the life they once led is being contested and changed at the same time”. The conditions for which ethnic conflicts however are much more narrow and hard to produce. Based on the research conducted for this research paper the conditions that are most likely to end ethnic conflict are the promotion of social integration and interactive civil society. The problem of segregation is that, as demonstrated by the examples of Rwanda and Yugoslavia, heterogeneous societies promote higher rates of tolerance of other ethnic groups. As for the case in Rwanda, reconciliation villages are the ideal example of how a society can deliberately promote peaceful and reconciled relations de facto of terrible ethnic violence. As for Yugoslavia, inclusive policy facilitated by the Dayton Agreement has allowed for different groups to live relatively different but peaceful lives. Going forward, it is important for diplomats and policymakers to re-evaluate how they might have once imagined protracted social conflicts like the Arab-Israeli conflict. The conditions for peace may be social integration and fostering new senses of community, but the implementation of these conditions will require original and new means of diplomacy. Perhaps, as our world globalizes, awareness of stateless, disenfranchised ethnic groups will rise and calls for peace from the international community will uplift these oppressed peoples.
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Anne Leahy 